Joint and Several Liability and Environmental Harm in the 1990\u27s by Madden, M. Stuart
Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 9, Number 3 2017 Article 3
Joint and Several Liability and Environmental
Harm in the 1990’s
M. Stuart Madden∗
∗Pace University School of Law
Copyright c©2017 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND
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M. Stuart Madden*
INTRODUCTION
While contemporary hazardous waste issues are mediated prin-
cipally through the application of permitting and clean-up re-
sponse statutes, there exists a backdrop of tort law that, at least
for now, operates in relative freedom from the gravitational pull
of such state and federal statutory obligations.
Where not expressly pre-empted by federal statute, or im-
pliedly pre-empted by the Water Pollution Control Act' and
Clean Air Act2 settings, where the comprehensive nature of fed-
eral activity is interpreted as leaving no room for either intersti-
tial development of federal common law or application of state
law private or public nuisance claims,3 state tort law remedies
continue to play a vital role. A central dynamic in application of
tort law remedies to injury or damage associated with waste prod-
ucts is the apportionment of responsibility among multiple
tortfeasors. 4 Apportionment issues, particularly in the products li-
ability context, often involve a measurement of the plaintiff's
contribution to the harm and a set-off of that fractional responsi-
bility against plaintiff's total recovery.5 In the environmental con-
text, however, the prevalent paradigm is that of the innocent
* Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor and Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Law, Pace University School of Law, New York.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994).
3. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987)(FWCPA); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981) (FWPCA); New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30
(2d Cir. 1981) (CAA). See GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, THE
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 216 (1994).
4. This essay, a fuller version of the author's presentation at the
Environmental Law Journal's Symposium, develops and refines aspects
of a lengthier treatment of joint liability and other issues that appeared
in 32 GA. L. REV. 1019 (1998).
5. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 279 n.4 (1970).
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plaintiff, i.e., a public or private entity that has not contributed
to the harm, seeking a remedy, most often for property damage
or lost value, but sometimes for personal physical injury, against
two or more culpable polluters.6
In this brief essay, I wish to first describe the operation of
common law joint and several liability, together with the effect
upon its application occasioned by the nearly universal modern
subscription to comparative fault principles. I will then sketch
the leading arguments for reform or abolition of joint liability,
followed by counter-arguments that it be retained, or if re-
formed, that such reform not be drastic. I will follow with a sum-
mary of modern joint liability reform efforts at the federal and
state levels and will conclude by identifying the approach
adopted in several states that I believe best serves established tort
principles, including but not limited to those of corrective justice
and economic efficiency.
I. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY GENERALLY
In general terms, under joint and several liability, a tort victim
injured by two or more tortfeasors "may recover his total dam-
ages from any one of the tortfeasors, regardless of the portion of
fault attributable to that tortfeasor."7 This venerable and conced-
edly plaintiff-favorable doctrine operated over the years to relieve
the plaintiff of the obligation of suing all concurrent tortfeasors
(an alleviation of at least a proportion of what Guido Calabresi
would term tertiary accident costs).' Pure joint and several liabil-
ity also meant that should a tortfeasor be insolvent or absent, the
remaining joint tortfeasor or tortfeasors, and not the plaintiff,
6. See generally Nancy Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A
Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limiiations on Joint and Sev-
eral Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 635 (1988) (explaining the opera-
tion and effect of joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors).
7. Id. See also MICHAEL HOENIG, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: SUBSTANTIVE,
PROCEDURAL AND POLICY ISSUES 191 (1992) ("At common law, the joint
and several liability imposed upon joint tortfeasors was indivisible.
Thus, any one of the joint tortfeasors was liable to the injured party for
the entire damage." (citing Musco v. Conte, 254 N.YS.2d 589, 593
(App. Div. 1954)).
8. See CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 28-29.
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would be liable for the so-called "orphan" share of the overall
proved damages. 9
Aaron Twerski has described the conventional joint and several
liability approach as "accentuat[ing] and exacerbat[ing] all the
imperfections that exist in the present tort compensation sys-
tem." 10 The principal argument against retention of joint and
several liability is that the doctrine provides an incentive for
plaintiffs to collect their award from the party with the deepest
pocket, rather than the party whose causal contribution to the
harm may have been the greatest."
II. STATE AND FEDERAL REFORM INITIATIVES - AN OVERVIEW
A. Profile of Contemporary Treatment of Joint Liability and
Comparative Fault
The common law of joint liability has sustained overwhelming
change within the past decade or more. Over thirty-three states
have either abandoned or modified it, ordinarily replacing it
with comparative fault or comparative causation principles on
the rationale that the changes establish a fairer liability standard
for multiple tortfeasors. 12
9. See Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Ra-
tional Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1989).
10. Id. at 1143, discussed in Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based
Compensation System for Product-Related Injuries, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 669,
703 n.173 (1997). The doctrine's distortion of realistic settlement nego-
tiations is described in HOENIG, supra note 7, in these words:
The more significant policy of encouraging reasonable settle-
ments is undermined because realistic evaluations of true
culpability need not impact upon the settlement demands.
An artificially high range of settlement evaluations ensues.
The tendency is to look at overall exposure, i.e. "how many
millions will this jury possibly award to this plaintiff?," rather
than "how much of the potential award is really attributable
to this defendant's fault."
11. See Larry Presler & Kevin V. Scheiffer, Joint and Several Liability:
A Case for Reform, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (1988). See also Manzer,
supra note 6, at 644, 651.
12. See Paul Bargren, Comment, Joint and Several Liability: Protection
for Plaintiffs, 1994 WIs. L. REV. 453 (1994).
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At both the state and federal levels, reformers have sometimes
wielded the meat axe and sometimes the surgeon's scalpel. A
meat axe approach was taken in the 1991 proposed Joint and
Several Liability Reform Act,'3 which provided that in any per-
sonal injury, property damage, or wrongful death action, liability
against multiple tortfeasors should be several only, and the deter-
mination of such several liability should properly take into ac-
count the proportion of responsibility attributable to absent or
impecunious actors - leaving the claimant, rather than the re-
maining defendant(s), to bear the burden of any orphan share.
The most recent federal initiative touching upon joint liability,
the Product Liability Reform Act of 1997,14 takes a moderate, in-
termediate approach of suggesting that joint liability be pre-
served for economic harm, but that liability be several for
noneconomic damages only.'5
On a state level, here follows a sampling of three tacks taken
or proposed:
When a party is insolvent, under "Modified Joint and Several
Liability," the comparatively responsible plaintiff "can initially
recover the full amount of his reduced claim from any available
and solvent tortfeasor, who then bears the expense of locating
the other tortfeasors, preparing and proving contribution
claims against them, and collecting on those claims .... ,,16
Under "Modified Proportionate Several Liability," in turn,
"the plaintiff must bear the expense of locating each tortfeasor,
preparing and proving liability claims against each of them, col-
lecting each tortfeasor's initial proportionate several liability
share, and then coming back to each (hopefully still) available
and solvent tortfeasor to collect her share of any uncollectible
shares." 7
13. 137 CONG. REc. S579-01, 897 (1991).
14. Product Liability Reform Act of 1997 § 110, S. Rep. No. 105-32
at 20 (105th Cong., 1st Sess. 1997).
15. The position taken in the Product Liability Reform Act § 110
is a so-called "fair share" of responsibility for noneconomic loss ap-
proach. Id. at 55.
16. Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Li-
ability, 23 MEM. ST. L. REv. 45, 79 (1992).
17. Id. at 79.
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Regarding allocation of the "Orphan Share Burden," still an-
other approach would place the burden or equitable obligation
of insolvent or absent tortfeasor's share upon all parties, includ-
ing the plaintiff.18 Thus, with a nonresponsible plaintiff, an 80%
responsible tortfeasor, and a 20% tortfeasor who is insolvent, the
remaining defendant would be responsible for 80% of the or-
phan 20% in damages, and the plaintiff's award would be re-
duced by 20% of the 20% share of the absent tortfeasor. This is
the position taken in the American Law Institute Reporter's Study:
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury. '9
B. Contemporary Joint Liability Reform Flaws From the Standpoint of
Corrective Justice and Economic Efficiency
1. Corrective Justice
Those opposing limitations upon pure joint and several liabil-
ity for noneconomic damages might endorse the comments of
former California Chief Justice Bird, who once stated in dissent:
Pain and suffering are afflictions shared by all human beings,
regardless of economic status. For poor plaintiffs, noneconomic
damages can provide the principal source of compensation for
reduced lifespan or loss of physical capacity .... [T]hese plain-
tiffs may be unable to prove substantial loss of future earnings
or other economic damages. 20
Along similar lines, criticizing the several liability provision of
an earlier reform proposal, Andrew F. Popper wrote:
The mere fact that pain and suffering are difficult to quantify
should not mean that plaintiffs are somehow not entitled to
joint and several liability .... By making joint and several lia-
bility unavailable for noneconomic damages, those plaintiffs
with the most devastating injuries would end up undercompen-
sated, even though they have proved the liability of the
18. John Scott Hickman, Note, Efficiency, Fairness and Common
Sense: The Case for One Action as to Percentage of Fault in Comparative Negli-
gence Jurisdictions that Have Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liability,
48 VAND. L. REv. 739, 745 (1995).
19. 2 REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURY 127-57 (A.L.I. 1991).
20. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 689 (Cal.
1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), discussed in Andrew F. Popper, A Federal
Tort Law is Still a Bad Idea: A Comment on Senate Bill 687, 16 J. PROD. &
Toxics LIAB. 105, 124-25 (1994) (alteration in original).
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defendant.2 1
In addition, Popper argues that tertiary accident costs are ele-
vated by any several liability reform proposal, in that "[s]uch vic-
tims would be forced to pursue [in separate litigation] each
party who had been in any way responsible for the victim's
injury. 22
The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Ap-
portionment3 retain as one option for Institute evaluation a rule
that would confine joint liability to economic harm and provid-
ing several liability under applicable comparative fault principles
for noneconomic harm.2 4 The Apportionment Restatement Reporters
suggest that a rationale for preserving joint liability only for eco-
nomic harm is that other compensation schemes, such as work-
ers' compensation, do so. 25 This position fails to take into ac-
count that a strict compensation scheme for liability for
economic harm or workers' compensation has always been visual-
ized as a bargained-for-exchange in which those suffering work-
place injuries could recover economic loss for them, without be-
ing subjected to the uncertainty and expense of bringing a tort
suit for all of their provable harm. The tort system remained
available for recovery of their other losses against responsible
parties other than the employer. The other participant in this
bargained-for-exchange was, of course, the employer, who for a
finite and relatively predictable assessment in workers' compensa-
tion insurance coverage could be relieved of defending tort
claims for greater amounts.2 6
Thus, the workers' compensation logic and justice has re-
mained intact for decades, with workers and employers having
relinquished something of value in order to achieve benefits. To
now introduce several liability for economic harm as a "reform,"
relying in part upon the logic of workers' compensation, sounds
tinny. Unlike the respective sacrifices made by workers and em-
ployers, at least conceptually, when workers' compensation was
21. Andrew F. Popper, A Federal Tort Law is Still a Bad Idea: A Com-
ment on Senate Bill 687, 16 J. PROD. & Toxics LiAB. 105, 125 (1994).
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT §27E (Council
Draft No. 2 1997).
24. Id. at § 27E & cmt. c.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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created, the potential Apportionment Restatement provision brings
nothing to the bargaining table. Rather than enjoying a filial
bond with other economic-harm strict-liability social insurance
schemes, the latter approach is parasitic, as it would take away
potential claims and offer nothing in return.
As regards the more drastic approach of total abolition of joint
and several liability, able criticism of such potential "reform" is
raised by Richard W. Wright, who uses the example of coffee
poisoning where an intentional poisoner and a negligent poi-
soner each lace decedent's coffee with a lethal dose.2 7 Let us
change the facts of the well-known New York environmental tort
decision of State v. Schenectady Chemicals Corp.,28 involving dump-
ing done by an independent contractor hired by Schenectady
Chemical to dispose of waste. Imagine that the independent con-
tractor, Dewy Loeffel, intentionally dumped 80% of the damag-
ing waste, and that another entity negligently disposed of 20% of
similar waste, thinking erroneously both that the site was lawful,
and further that the containers, in which the material was dis-
posed of, were sufficient to contain the waste. Imagine further
that either quantity of waste, be it 80% or 20%, would suffice to
totally degrade the property and the underlying aquifer.
Should joint tort liability be totally abolished, and if Mr. Loef-
fel were insolvent, neither New York's claim in public nuisance,
nor a "special harm" individual's claim in public nuisance, nor
an individual's claim in private nuisance, could recover more
than 20% of its proved harm against the severally liable remain-
ing defendant. 29 Further to the assessment that such "reform" of
joint liability stymies the corrective justice goals of tort remedies,
an important part of Wright's argument against "reform" of joint
and several liability is its claim that the jointly liable party's suc-
cessful or unsuccessful contribution or indemnity claim against
another tortfeasor "is secondary to the plaintiffs prior and inde-
pendent corrective justice claim against each tortfeasor."30
27. See Wright, supra note 16, at 60-62.
28. 459 N.YS.2d 971 (NY Sup. Ct. 1983), aff'd as modified, 479
N.YS.2d 1010 (1984).
29. See Wright, supra note 16, at 59.
30. Id. at 61, discussed in Lilly v. Marcal Rope & Rigging, 682
N.E.2d 481, 488 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997). See also JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 228 (1996):
[Where] all of the joint tortfeasors, by definition, acted tor-
tiously and actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's in-
1998]
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There are, nevertheless, material limitations to Wright's argu-
ment. In the context of the poisoned coffee example, Wright's
point is seemingly confined by its premise that each poisoner
. "put enough poison in plaintiffs coffee to kill her."31 This scena-
rio does not address the joint and several liability example that
proponents of several liability love to hate, i.e., when a defend-
ant's substandard conduct contributes only minimally to plain-
tiff's harm, but imposition of joint and several liability burdens
that defendant with the totality of plaintiff's proved damages.
Emblematic of this predicament in logic and fairness is the no-
torious plaintiff's verdict in Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood,32 which
involved an amusement park bumper car accident, where plain-
tiff's judgement-proof fiancee was adjudged 85% responsible,
plaintiff 14% responsible, and Walt Disney World 1% responsible.
Upon appeal, Disney was left with liability for not only its partici-
pation in the injury, but also for the lion's share of the insolvent
tortfeasor's liability, leaving Disney responsible for 86% of the
damages in a suit in which its causal contribution was but 1%.31
The irrationality of a Disney result, however, will often be ame-
liorated in the environmental tort context. In Disney, plaintiff was
responsible for a material portion of the harm done, a percent-
age greater than that attributable to Disney. However, in most
environmental torts, the injured party is innocent of contribution
to his or her harm, and the tortfeasors, be they all before the
court or even should only a subset be before the court, will by
definition have each contributed more to plaintiff's harm than
did plaintiff.
Even if the plaintiff is responsible for a proportion of the envi-
ronmental harm, Calabresi suggests that absent a coherent appli-
jury[,] [i]n most cases, under usual 'but for' causation analy-
sis, the injury would have been totally avoided if any of the
defendants had acted nonculpably. In this sense, the percent-
age allocation determined by the fact-finder is only a com-
parative measure of the ideal apportionment among wrong-
doers, each of whom, it can be argued, should be fully liable
to the plaintiff for all of the plaintiffs losses because any of
them could have, by acting non-negligently, protected the
plaintiff from injury.
31. Marcal, 682 N.E.2d at 487.
32. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
33. See id. at 202. See also 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 19, at 151
n.28.
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cation of comparative fault to joint and several liability circum-
stances, the fairness or unfairness of retaining joint and several
liability cannot be gauged.3 4 Assume, Calabresi proposes, a 60%
responsible defendant, a 10% responsible defendant, and a 30%
responsible plaintiff.35 Assume further that the 60% responsible
defendant is unavailable or bankrupt. The jury places 70% of re-
sponsibility on the 10% responsible defendant, and 30% respon-
sibility upon plaintiff. If the jury intended that the plaintiff, even
though three times more responsible than the remaining defend-
ant, recover 70% of the total harm from him, the result, Cala-
bresi writes, "seems both unfair and contrary to what the jury
found. '' 36 If, on the other hand, the jury meant that the defend-
ants together were 70% responsible, and that the 10%/60% allo-
cation between them "was no more than an equitable split as to
them, a split that did not concern their individual responsibility
to plaintiff at all," then, Calabresi concludes, retention of joint
and several liability in a comparative responsibility context
"might be as fair as the previous hypothetical made it seem un-
fair."37 Calabresi writes that until courts appreciate "the full con-
sequences of the shift from an all or nothing rule to a splitting
rule[,] . . .efforts at reform are bound to be haphazard and
nonsensical." 38
2. Economic Efficiency
An efficiency argument favoring some form of several liability re-
form (although not necessarily that contained in the Reporter's
Study) is found in Calabresi's least cost avoider approach. 39
Landes and Posner agree, harmoniously, that as to risk remedia-
tion, we do not want all joint tortfeasors to participate, but
rather only the tortfeasor who can take action most efficiently.40
34. See Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort
Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 880-81 (1996).
35. See id. at 880.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 881.
38. Id.
39. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 797-98 (1997).
40. See Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561,
575 (Wyo. 1992).
1998]
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In the ordinary course, whether the defendant is an automobile
manufacturer or an environmental polluter, the tortfeasor whose
contribution to a plaintiff's harm is the greatest will be the
tortfeasor who can most readily and efficiently detect and rem-
edy the risk.41
Following this line of reasoning, the greatest incentives for effi-
cient and societally acceptable conduct should ordinarily rest
with the party that can foresee or remedy that wastefil or harm-
ful conduct, while proportionately lesser incentives would be ap-
parent to tortfeasors whose likely causal contribution would be
less. To conclude otherwise would, in Judge Higgenbotham's rea-
soning in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank,42 make potential
liability so great in relation to wrongdoing as to disassociate con-
duct from consequences. 43
Efficiency principles seemingly support retention of joint liabil-
ity in some form for noneconomic loss. Extrapolating from an
example provided by Robin Paul Malloy, 44 imagine a suburban
water district and a residential water wholesaler together selling
filtered well water to local residents. The water of six particular
homes is uniquely affected by minerals in such quantities as to
make the water responsible for intestinal illness in those who
drink it. Suppose further that the personal injury value is $100
per home, for a total of $600. Two options exist for remedying
the problem. First, a water filtering device can be installed at the
district distribution point at a cost of $300. Alternatively, each
resident can be provided with a home water purifier at a cost of
$75 per home, at a total cost of $450. Installing the filter at the
distribution point eliminates total damages of $600 at a cost of
$300, and represents the efficient economic solution to the exter-
nality problem by avoiding having to spend $75 per residence for
a total $450.
Under "reform" that provides several liability only for
noneconomic harm, a resident enduring pain and suffering loss
41. See id. at 575.
42. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. See id. at 1029.
44. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS 35-38 (1990). (Malloy
acknowledges the similarity of his example to that found in A. MITCH-
ELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 11-14 (1983)).
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due to intestinal illness caused by the contaminated water would
be unable to recover any fraction of proven noneconomic harm
should one of the two arguable tortfeasors (the water district or
the residential water wholesaler) be insolvent. In addition to the
hardship imposed upon residents by this illness, such an ap-
proach invites several inefficiencies, not the least of which is that
a several liability for noneconomic harm approach undermines
the economic efficiency of the least cost avoider approach. Ab-
sent a rule of joint liability that would obligate each of two or
more joint tortfeasors to at least conceptually acknowledge that
their capacity to recognize and remediate the risk was superior
to that of plaintiffs, the tortfeasors and the victims alike are en-
couraged to undertake inefficient measures.
The remaining tortfeasor that will be left answerable in dam-
ages knows at the very least that his or her liability will be for
less than the entirety of plaintiff's loss, and thus has less incen-
tive to remedy the risk than it would under conventional joint li-
ability. The victims, in turn, recognize that should illness occur,
they will potentially be able to gain reparation for only a fraction
of their noneconomic harm. Consequently, they may be
prompted to take measures in their own hands by, for example,
adopting the inefficient course of installing filters in their indi-
vidual homes.
Proceeding to a higher level of generality, the question might
be put as one of whether unfettered joint and several liability
can be considered wasteful. The least cost avoider approach, with
the premium placed upon imposing the burden of liability upon
the actor who can remedy a risk least expensively, permits the
conclusion that it is wasteful to require all tortfeasors, even those
minimally at fault, to comport themselves as though they may
bear responsibility for the totality of a harm. 41
CONCLUSION
Both corrective justice and efficiency tenets would be better
served by a solution such as that adopted in many states, and
which provides for alleviation of joint and several liability when
45. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. in/v Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029
(5th Cir. 1985).
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defendant's contribution to the harm is less than a defined
amount, such as 50%.46 Least cost avoider and discouragement of
post hoc coerced transfer objectives would remain intact under
such a modified approach. At the same time, the plaintiff's para-
mount right to compensation for proved tortious harm would
not be stemmed arbitrarily at the line separating economic ver-
sus noneconomic harm, but rather at a more commonsense
threshold based upon a defendant's actual contribution to the
harm. The deterrence objectives of both corrective justice and ef-
ficiency would, in fact, be best served by such a modified ap-
proach, as actors anticipating conduct (including omission to
act) routinely gauge planned action not upon considerations of
potential liability for economic harm as opposed to
noneconomic harm, but rather upon evaluation of the level at
which their behavior is likely to be deemed a legal cause of
plaintiff's overall harm.
Lastly, total abolition of joint liability for noneconomic harm is
a more drastic remedy than is necessary to lessen the likelihood
of bizarre results such as that reached in Walt Disney Co. v.
Wood.47 A confinement of joint liability to situations where
defendant's contribution to the harm exceeds, for example, 50%,
would, without more, preclude the facially unjust imposition of a
liability judgment bearing no relation whatsoever to a defend-
ant's participation in the wrongdoing.
46. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-64-122(C).
47. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
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